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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
HARRY G. HEATHMAN,
Pl.aintiff-Appellant,

v.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, Law Firm
of the following partners:
HAROLD P. FABIAN, BEVERLY
S. CLENDENIN, R E N D E L L N.
MABEY, PE!TER W. BILLINGS,
SANFORD M. STODDARD, ALBERT J. COLTON, DUDLE,Y
Al\fOSS, RALPH H. MILLER, K. J.
HOLDSWORTH, BRYCE E. ROE,
ALLEN KENT SHEARER, SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR., and Kathleen
Cholley,

Case No.
9643

Defend,ant,s-Respondents.

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENT'S' BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued the defendant law firm, and one of
its secretaries, for money damages allegedly sustained
as a result of the manner in which defendants conducted
a portion of the defense against plaintiff's earlier suit
against Sumner J. Hatch, a Salt Lake City attorney.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Ray Van
Cott, Jr., Judge, granted defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiff's amended complaint and denied plaintiff's mot~ion for leave to file a second amended complaint, all
as shown by the judgment of February 6, 1962 (R. 21).
R,ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the judgment of
dismissal and to grant him permission to file a second
amended complaint.
STATEJ\tfEN,T OF FACTS
To understand plaintiff's contentions on this appeal,
it is necessary to refer to a portion of the record on
appeal in the earlier case of Ha"rry G. Heathman v.
Sumner J. Hatch, Supreme Court Case No. 9593, which
record is still in this Court.
References to that record will be by case number
and page of that record (for example, No. 9593, R. 100).
All other record references \\rill refer to the lower court
record in the instant case.
Plaintiff sued Sumner J. llatch in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 1285H9, and when the file
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revealed no appearance on behalf of the defendant, the
clerk entered a default certificate (No. 9593, R. 118).
On the, srune day, Hatch's attorneys, the defendants
herein, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint (No.
9593, R. 119) and the next day they filed a notice of
motion, with affidavit attached, giving notice that they
would, on the day set forth in the notice, move the court
for an order striking the default certificate and setting
aside the default, it being represented by the affidavit
that a copy of the motion to dismiss had been mailed to
plaintiff by defendants on the day prior to the default
(No. 9593, R. 120).
The hearing on these matters, in which the court
received evidence and heard argument, came on before
District Court Judge Aldon J. Anderson on January 19,
1961, as shown by the transcript thereof (No. 9593, R.
178, et seq.). On January 24, 1961, Judge Anderson
signed

aJ1

order striking the default certificate and set-

itng aside the default, the defendant "having satisfied
the court and having shown good cause that said entry
of default should be set aside in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 55 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." In the same order the court also denied
plaintiff's motion for default judgment (No. 9593. R.
l-+7).
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Three days later, plaintiff commenced the instant
suit by his complaint (R. 1), which was followed, before
a responsive pleading was due or filed, by an amended
complaint (R. 4, 5 and 6).
In the arnended complaint, plaintiff claimed the
affidavit attached to the notice of motion (No. 9593, R.
120) in H ea.thman v. Hatch was false and that this "false
pleading'' was thereafter "maintained" by the defendants
up to and including the date of the hearing before Judge
Anderson. It was further alleged some of defendants
discussed the default certificate and the motion to dismiss with other District Judges prior to that hearing.
Plaintiff then contended that this alleged conduct by
defendants prevented him from ''getting default judgment signed" and violated "rights and privileges", not
otherwise specified, to which plaintiff claims he is entitled by the Constitution and laws of this state (R. 6).
Defendants filed a 1notion to dismiss upon the
ground that the amended complaint failed to state a claim
on which relief could he granted against the defendants
or any of them, and upon the further ground that the
amended eomplaint constituted a eollateral attack on the
order of Judge Anderson dated January 24, 1961 (R. 8).
Defendants' 1not,ion was heard and granted by Judge
Ray Yan Cott. ~T r., February 5. 1962. Plaintiff then
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moved in open court for leave to file a second amended
complaint, which motion was denied. These rulings were
formalized by a judgment of dismissal made and entered
hy the lower court February 6, 1962 (R. 21).
From this judgn1ent plaintiff appeals.
ARGUMENT'
POINT 1.
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND

ITS

J U D G MEN T

SHOULD

THEREFORE

BE

AFFIRMED.

The amended complaint is based entirely upon the
alleged improper conduct of the defendants during the
time the parties in the case of Heathman v. Hatch were'
concerned with the problem of the default certificate
which had been entered by the clerk at the request of
the plaintiff.
Because of this alleged conduct, plaintiff claims he
was deprived of a default judgment, and it is his apparent
contention, as revealed more fully from his brief, that
he was entitled to a default judgment as a matter of
right and as a part of the privileges and rights under the
organic and statutory law of this state. As admitted by
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plaintiff in his brief (Page 2), he· had sued Mr. Hat~b
for alleged malpractice, and his complaint against Hatch
revealed a demand for unliquidated damages for such
alleged malpractice. (No. 959.3, R. 114-a.)
As is shown by Rule 55 (a) ( 2), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, such a claim for damages, not being for a sum
ce:rtain or for a sum which can he made certain by computation, cannot be reduced to judgment until application
is made to the District Court which "may conduct such
hearings or order such references as it deems necessary
and proper."

It is thus seen that plaintiff had no "right" to a
judgment by default without proceeding further than is
shown by this record.
Even if plaintiff had an absolute right to a judgment
by default, under the circumstances he has set forth, he
has alleged no facts, nor can facts be inferred from his
pleading, that show that any eonduet of the defendants
prevented surh judgment.
Instead, his amended complaint is replete with broad
and sweeping aecusations, all of ''"hich had been fully
aired, and decided adve,rsely to plaintiff, by the District
Court only a few days prior to the institution of the
instant suit.
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Although plaintiff has the burden of showing that
his alleged claim entitles him to relief, he has cited no
ea~P. and none has been found by defendants, holding
that lawyers who prevail on behalf of one party in a
proceeding thereby become liable to the opposing party,
particularly where the claim by the loser of improper
conduct by the lawyers has been expressly considered
and rejected hy a court of competent jurisdiction.
The mere statement of the proposition reveals its
absurdity.

A holding to the contrary would render

rneaningless the exercise of ·wise discretion by trial courts
whose duty it is to supervise the conduct of counsel who
appear before them.
Further,

la''~Ters

whose conduct is examined and

approved by the trial courts should not thereupon be
subjected to irresponsible attack by t:he opponents of
their clients, for to permit such attack would endanger
every citizen's right to the wise and aggressive representation by eounsel of his choice.

It is therefore clear that plaintiff's amended complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be
granted and the trial court's ruling to that effect was
proper. But, as will be seen, the decision of the trial
court can be, and should be. upheld on a further ground.
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The facts, as shown by this record and the record in
No. 9593, re·veal that District Judge Aldon J. Anderson,
after .a full hearing, concluded that the default certificate
ought to be set aside (No. 9593, R. 231). The ruling of the
court was made under the provisions of Rule 55 (c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, it having appeared to the court
that "good cause" had been shown as required by the
rule (No. 9593, R. 147).
Judge Anderson's ruling was made from the bench
January 19, 1961 (No. 9593, R. 231). The formal order
(No. 9593, R. 147) was signed January 24, 1961, and on
that same day plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
in the same case (No. 9593, R. 141-146), again complaining, among other things, about the san1e allegedly false
affidavit filed by defendant and "allowed to stand against
plaintiff.''
Three days later, plaintiff filed a third runended
complaint, in which he amended the allegation concerning
the affidavit, so that it ''Tas then contended that Mr.
Hatch ''through his attorneys" (the defendants in the
instant case) filed the claimed false affidavit (No. 9593,
R. 152).
25 days later plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit
against Mr. Hatch and, on the srune day, filed a new
action .aginst him under another case number in the Distriet Court. The new action, civil case No. 129540, again
a.RRPrted the contention that Hatch through his attorneys
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(the defendants in the instant case) filed and maintained
a false pleading with an annexed affidavit (No. 9593,
R. 1).

Plaintiff then amended his new complaint twice, but
the new pleadings contain no reference to the claimed
false pleading or affidavit, and an examinati.on of plaintiff's brief and the record in Case No. 9593 reveals that
plaintiff did not thereafter pursue the point.
From the foregoing factual reeitation, and from the
statement of facts previously set forth, it is clear that:
(1) The claims made by plaintiff in the instant
case are the same as those he unsuccessfully maintained before .Judge Anderson in the hearing of
January 19, 1961.
(2) The order by Judge Anderson signed
January 24, 1961, constituted a formal ruling that
the court had rejected the very claims that plaintiff
now asserts in the instant suit.
( 3) Plaintiff did not ask Judge Anderson to
reconside·r his ruling by motion or otherwise, and
he did not attempt, throughout his appeal, to obtain
a reversal thereof.
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(4) Instead, he asserted the same claim by
amended pleadings but thereafter abandoned the
claim in each of the suits against Mr. Hatch.
( 5) By the present suit, therefore, plaintiff
seeks to avoid and evade the effect of the ruling of
the court, and as such, his action constitutes a collateral attack upon Judge Anderson's order and
should not be countenanced by this court.
The law has provided a method by which a litigant
may obtain relief against an erroneous or improper
judgment. In Interm:ill v. N.ash (1938), 94 Utah-271, 75
P.2d 157, this court outlined the course a dissatisfied
litigant must follow:
"If he does not test the soundness of the
judgment by the methods law has provided for
that purpose, he cannot question or assail the
same for errors in the judg1nent, or the proceeding in which it ·was entered when in another proceeding it is pleaded or produced in evidence
against hiin."
The rea.Ron for the rule is clearly stated by this court:
"The courts, functioning to detennine and
settle property rights, upon which persons may
rely and the security of society be built, should
·enjoy, in their forn1al pronouncements, every
possible degree of conclusiveness. To permit
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their determinations to be lightly regarded or
easily evaded would render them nugatory, and
be a source of litigation and friction rather than
to put an end thereto."
T·ested by the foregoing rules, it is clear that plaintiff now seeks to obtain damages upon contentions which
have already been rejected by a court in another proceeding, which rejection he did not choose to attaak directly,
and he cannot now, under cover of this proceeding, ask
this or any court to grant him relief which would have
the effect of overturning the considered judgment of a
District Judge in an other proceeding.
In the Intermill case this court quoted with approval
from other courts which have held :
"When the direct purpose and aim of the
proceeding is to attain relief other than the setting aside or modifying of the judgment, and the
attack upon the judgment is involved merely inridentally, the attack is collateraL"
Plaintiff's present action clearly falls within the
srope of that definition.

CONCLUSION
In this appeal, plaintiff has the burden to show
affirmatively that the judgment of which he complains
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was erroneous. The rule is as stated by this court rin

Burton v. Zions Cooperative MercantiJle Institution
(1952), 122 Utah 360, 249 P.2'd. 514:
''There is a presumption that the judgment
of the! trial court was correct, and every reasonable intendment must be indulged in favor of it;
the burden of affirmatively showing error is on
the party complaining thereof."
Tested by this rule, and even allowing for the fact
that plaintiff is not represented by a lawyer, it is obvious
that plaintiff has not shown how or in what manner he
might be entitled to relief under any statement or implication of fact in his amended complaint, and he· has presented nothing to this court to avoid the obvious
conclusion that his present suit constitutes a collateral
attack upon an earlier proceeding in the District Court.
Under these circu1nstances, the judgment of the
District Court of Salt Lake County should be affirmed
and this oppressive litigation thereby tenninated.
Respectfully submitted,
John H. Snow
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
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